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In recent years, Eurozone governments have developed safety nets to deal with the
economic and financial crisis, but these have been developed in a trial and error fashion.
 Michiel Bijlsma and Shahin Vallee argue that we must build on the current European
Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism with further policies that will
help to resolve the banking crisis, by issuing common debt (Eurobonds), and by promoting
the idea of fiscal transfers within the EU.
The financial crisis has exposed the need to devise stronger and broader international and
regional safety nets in order to deal with economic and financial shocks and allow for
countries to adjust. The Euro area has developed several such mechanisms in recent years
through a process of trial and error and gradual enhancement and expansion. However, their
overall architecture remains imperfect and leaves areas of vulnerabilities.
Europe suffers from three simultaneous and mutually reinforcing crises: banking crises, fiscal
crises, and balance-of-payment (BOP) crises. Each can occur because of transitory liquidity
shock or a more permanent solvency problem but the lines are very often blurred and the
associated policy response therefore often uneasy. Table 1 shows the various categories of
crises and the existing solutions.
Table 1: Categories of crises and Current solutions
In May 2010, European governments created the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and thereby
started a process of strengthening financial safety nets in order to deal with fiscal crises. But the original
design of the EFSF was inadequate and led to the creation of a more permanent and solid European Stability
Mechanism (ESM). Until very recently, this mechanism was largely unequipped to deal with banking crises
and to provide the type of ongoing risk sharing mechanisms that would allow balance of payment imbalances
to adjust. As a result, this gap was met by the ECB, which provided liquidity probably over and above what it
would have tolerated if there was a proper banking resolution mechanism in place and if there were more
transparent ways to allow for capital to flow across national borders.
This architecture is constantly evolving, which requires a more systematic and methodological approach.
Creating financial safety nets involves a trade-off between moral hazard, insurance, and contagion, since
unconditional insurance diminishes the prevention effort on behalf of the insured, while too-much insurance
can threaten the sustainability of the insurer resulting in a domino-effect. In addition, as Jean Tirole argues
here, the current situation brings additional complications because insurance has to be provided after the
fact, when ‘the veil of ignorance is lifted’, resulting in a focus on avoiding collateral damage inflicted by a
country in distress.  Real contractual insurance for countries before they run into difficulties, might (but does
not necessarily) involve solidarity like joint-and-several liabilities.
Indeed, this kind of solidarity is still in the process of being defined and three stumbling blocs need particular
attention: (i) insurance related to the banking system, which remain inexistent so far, (ii) insurance for large
countries under stress that cannot be dealt with by the ESM as it is constructed, and (iii) and insurance in the
case of protracted external imbalances that result in unsustainable debt levels.
1. European banking resolution
The ESM is an embryo for banking crises resolution. It is hard to see how its role as a financier of bank
restructuring can be addressed separately from an integral banks restructuring and resolution framework.
When faced with banks in distress that are not yet in default, regulators face a choice between several
measures including recapitalization, ring fencing bad assets, restructuring creditors’ claims, temporary
nationalization, and sale to private parties. Restricting the ESM’s role to a pure financier creates a bias
towards blanket recapitalization. Furthermore, there are cross-border externalities. This calls for an institution
that can internalize those effects.
Doubts about states’ abilities to guarantee deposits are currently leading to intra-EMU deposit flight.
Supranational guarantees or backstops to national guarantees would reduce this. Such guarantees would
require pooling of fiscal resources and a degree of trust in national banking systems that can only be
achieved through federal supervision.
2. Dealing with large countries
Fiscal crises in large countries can only be overcome with ECB liquidity provisions to the ESM, if a default is
to be avoided. This can be achieved directly through large interventions or through ESM access to an ECB
discount window.
Another option would be common debt issuance by countries. Many challenges remain but eurobonds would
ensure favorable market access without ECB involvement in the short-run and could also prevent future
crises. It would cut the feedback-loop between sovereigns and banks if banks hold eurobonds instead of
national debt. These proposals require deeper institutional reforms, and they need to address moral hazard
concerns.
3. Transfers inside a monetary union and lack thereof
In the words of Tirole, the lack of exchange rate adjustments ‘precludes soft default and generates hard
default.’ In other words, currency risk turns into default risk. If such default is to be prevented, for example
because of collateral damage due to contagion effects, monetary unions should have strong financial safety
nets, which can amount to financial transfers between countries. But legal provisions limit these transfers in
EMU. Nevertheless, several risk-sharing arrangements have already been created (e.g. through TARGET2 or
bilateral, EFSF or ESM loans).
The alternative to transfers is pure internal adjustment, by lowering wages and prices, fiscal devaluation, or
spending cuts. But wage adjustment can be too slow because of prolonged uncoordinated bargaining
between employers, employees and the government, while spending cuts can -under special circumstances
– be costly to the point of being self-defeating.  If internal adjustment is not possible and hard default is to be
avoided, more pooling of shock absorbing policies at the European level is required. However, this involves
the politically sensitive topic of transfers. Ultimately, if members cannot agree on transfers, orderly default
mechanisms for countries need to be installed. One might even consider whether such default mechanisms
should involve euro exit. However, the mere possibility of currency union exits would make such a union
inherently unstable.
Table 2: Future EMU safety net arrangements.
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